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Dreaming is still a mystery of human cognition, although it has been studied experimen-
tally for more than a century. Experimental psychology ﬁrst investigated dream content
and frequency. The neuroscientiﬁc approach to dreaming arose at the end of the 1950s
and soon proposed a physiological substrate of dreaming: rapid eye movement sleep. Fifty
years later, this hypothesis was challenged because it could not explain all of the character-
istics of dream reports. Therefore, the neurophysiological correlates of dreaming are still
unclear, and many questions remain unresolved. Do the representations that constitute
the dream emerge randomly from the brain, or do they surface according to certain para-
meters? Is the organization of the dream’s representations chaotic or is it determined by
rules? Does dreaming have a meaning? What is/are the function(s) of dreaming? Psycho-
analysis provides hypotheses to address these questions. Until now, these hypotheses
have received minimal attention in cognitive neuroscience, but the recent development of
neuropsychoanalysis brings new hopes of interaction between the two ﬁelds. Considering
the psychoanalytical perspective in cognitive neuroscience would provide new directions
and leads for dream research and would help to achieve a comprehensive understanding
of dreaming. Notably, several subjective issues at the core of the psychoanalytic approach,
such as the concept of personal meaning, the concept of unconscious episodic mem-
ory and the subject’s history, are not addressed or considered in cognitive neuroscience.
This paper argues that the focus on singularity and personal meaning in psychoanalysis is
needed to successfully address these issues in cognitive neuroscience and to progress in
the understanding of dreaming and the psyche.
Keywords: dream, neurophysiological correlates of dreaming, dream functions, unconscious, personal meaning,
neuroimaging, psychoanalysis
The word “dream” is commonly used to express an unattainable
ideal or a very deep and strong desire:
I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in
a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their
skin, but by the content of their character.
MartinLutherKing
In dream reports, however, one often notices banal situations,
strange scenes, or even frightening events.Why is there such a con-
trast between the popular meaning of the word “dream” and the
content of dream reports? Why are some dream scenes so bizarre?
Are dreams built from images that arise randomly from the sleep-
ing brain? Or is the emergence and organization of dream images
controlledby currently unknownparameters?Doesdreaminghave
a function?
Answering these questions is not easy because dreaming is elu-
sive. We still do not know when it happens during the night, how
long it lasts, whether we can recall its entire content, or how to
control it. For more than a century, such limited understand-
ing of dreaming has seriously hampered experimental investiga-
tions. Nonetheless, scientiﬁc research has managed to produce
considerable information about the phenomenology and physi-
ology of dreaming and has improved our understanding of this
fascinating phenomenon.
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH ON DREAMING
DREAMING AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
Dream content
Dreaming was ﬁrst investigated on an experimental level in the
nineteenth century. Calkins (1893) published the ﬁrst statistical
results about dreaming and argued that some aspects of dream
content could be quantiﬁed. Later, questionnaires and automatic
analysis of the lexical content of dream reports allowed psychol-
ogists to show that dream content has some precise phenome-
nological characteristics. According to psychological studies (Hall
and Van de Castle, 1966; Schwartz, 1999), visual imagery occurs
more frequently in dreams than imagery of other senses (audi-
tion, olfaction, touch, and taste); the dream drama is mostly lived
by the dreamer from a ﬁrst-person perspective; some elements of
real-life events previously experienced by the dreamer often con-
tribute to the scene of the dream; most often, the dream sequence
is not within the dreamer’s voluntary control (i.e., the dreamer
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may be convinced during the dream that the dream’s story is really
happening); temporal and spatial incoherencies can occur in the
dream story; the dream report is often full of people interacting
with each other (e.g., discussions, ﬁghts, pursuit, sexuality); and
ﬁnally, the dream report often contains strong emotions.
Substantial variability of content exists, however, among the
same individual’s dreams and among the dreams of different
individuals. Further, psychological studies have shown that many
internal and external parameters can inﬂuence dream content.
For example, males report more aggression and violence in their
dreams than do females (Nielsen et al., 2003; Schredl et al., 2004).
External stimulation perceived by the dreamer can be incorpo-
rated into dreams (Koulack, 1969; Saint-Denys, 1867; Hoelscher
et al., 1981), as illustrated by the famous Dali painting Dream
Caused by the Flight of a Bee around a Pomegranate a Second before
Awakening. The current concerns of the subject may also be found
in the content of his/her dreams (Schwartz, 1999; Domhoff and
Schneider, 2008), and many aspects of the subject’s daily life were
found to inﬂuence dream content, including news events (Bulke-
ley and Kahan, 2008), musical practice (Uga et al., 2006), religious
beliefs (Domhoff and Schneider, 2008), chronic pain (Raymond
et al., 2002), mood (Cartwright et al., 1998a), or a violent liv-
ing environment (Valli et al., 2005). By contrast, congenital or
acquired malformations do not seem to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
dream content (Voss et al., 2010; Saurat et al., 2011).
Based on these results, two opposing hypotheses were formu-
lated: the continuity hypothesis (Schredl and Hofmann, 2003) and
the discontinuity hypothesis (Rechtschaffen, 1978; Kahn et al.,
1997; Stickgold et al., 2001). The former relies on results show-
ing that the themes of an individual’s thoughts during waking life
and dreaming are similar; the latter focuses on the fundamentally
different structures of thoughts during waking life and dream-
ing. Voss et al. (2010) stressed in their recent paper that these
hypotheses represent oversimpliﬁed approaches to dream analysis
and argued that waking and dreaming thoughts were related but
structurally independent; in other words, she argued in favor of
merging the continuity and discontinuity hypotheses.
Dream report frequency
Dream report frequency (DRF) can vary within subjects and
varies substantially among subjects. In a study of 900 German
subjects with a large age range from various socioprofessional cat-
egories, the mean DRF was approximately 1 dream report per
week (Schredl, 2008). This result shows that the dream experience
is common and familiar to everyone. Psychological studies have
demonstrated that many parameters covary with DRF and may
thus inﬂuence it.
Sleep parameters. First, DRF varies according to the sleep stage
preceding awakening (e.g., Dement and Kleitman, 1957b; Nielsen,
2000, for a review). More dream reports are obtained after an
awakening during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep than after
an awakening during non-REM (NREM) sleep. These results
inspired the REM sleep hypothesis of dreaming (see the section
Dreaming and Neuroscience). Second, DRF increases with the
number of awakenings during sleep, according to retrospective
self-evaluations of awakenings (Cory and Ormiston, 1975; Schredl
et al., 2003). Such studies showed that themore the subjects tended
to awaken during sleep, the higher their DRF. These results sup-
port the hypothesis of Koulack and Goodenough (1976), which
proposes that nocturnal awakenings facilitate the encoding of the
dream in memory and thus facilitate dream recall upon awak-
ening. However, this hypothesis has not been tested by measuring
awakenings with polysomnographic recordings in healthy subjects
with various DRFs. Finally,DRF varies according to the method of
awakening. Abrupt awakenings lead to more dream reports than
gradual awakenings (Shapiro et al., 1963, 1965; Goodenough et al.,
1965).
Physiological and environmental parameters. Dream report fre-
quency deceases with age (e.g., Schredl, 2008) and tends to be
slightly higher among females than males (e.g., Schredl, 2008;
Schredl and Reinhard, 2008). Remarkably, Schredl’s (2008) results
revealed that DRF also varied according to the size of the subject’s
place of residence.
Psychological parameters. First, increased professional stress or
interpersonal stress resulted in an increase in DRF (for a review,
see Schredl, 1999). Second, an interest in dreams or a positive atti-
tude toward dreams clearly covaries with DRF (Hill et al., 1997;
Schredl, 1999; Schredl et al., 2003). The greater an individual’s
interest in dreams, the higher his/her DRF. Third, several cogni-
tive abilities have been found to covary with DRF. Contradictory
results have been reported for the correlation between DRF and
memory abilities (short-term, long-term, visual, verbal, implicit,
and explicit; signiﬁcant positive correlation: Cory and Ormis-
ton, 1975; Belicki et al., 1978; Butler and Watson, 1985; Schredl
et al., 1995; Solms, 1997; no signiﬁcant correlation: Cohen, 1971;
Belicki et al., 1978; Schredl et al., 1995, 1997, 2003; Solms, 1997)
and the correlation between DRF and visual imagery (signiﬁcant
positive correlation: Hiscock and Cohen, 1973; Richardson, 1979;
Okada et al., 2000;no signiﬁcant correlation: Hill et al., 1997;Okada
et al., 2000). However, several studies have consistently shown that
DRF is positively correlated with creativity (Fitch and Armitage,
1989; Schredl, 1999; Schredl et al., 2003) and intelligence scales
(multiple-choice vocabulary test, Schonbar, 1959; Shipley Intel-
ligence Scale, Connor and Boblitt, 1970). Finally, many authors
have reported a correlation between DRF and personality traits.
Subjects with a high DRF are more likely to have a personality
with thinner boundaries (Hartmann described people with thin
boundaries as being open, trustworthy, vulnerable, and sensitive;
Hartmann, 1989; Hartmann et al., 1991; Schredl et al., 2003), to be
more anxious (Schonbar,1959;Tart, 1962), to have a higher level of
absorption (the absorption scale measures the capacity to become
absorptively involved in imaginative and esthetic experiences; Hill
et al., 1997; Schredl, 1999; Schredl et al., 2003), to be more open
to experience (Hill et al., 1997; Schredl et al., 2003), and to be less
alexithymic (alexithymia is a personality variable that incorporates
difﬁculty identifying and describing feelings, difﬁculty distin-
guishing between feelings and the physical sensation of emotional
arousal, limited imaginative processes, and an externally oriented
cognitive style; De Gennaro et al., 2003; Nielsen et al., 2011) com-
pared to subjectswith a lowdreamrecall frequency.However, those
results have not always been reproducible (e.g., Schredl, 2002 for
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openness to experience; Cory and Ormiston, 1975;Hill et al., 1997
for anxiety; Nielsen et al., 1997 for alexithymia) and, according to
the recent review by Blagrove and Pace-Schott (2010), it is difﬁ-
cult to draw conclusions about a possible link between personality
traits and DRF.
In conclusion, numerous parameters have been identiﬁed that
covary with DRF. Schredl stressed in many of his papers that the
studied parameters usually explain only a small percentage of the
total variance (e.g., Schredl, 2008). Thus, the DRF variation proﬁle
suggests that the production, encoding and recall of dreams are
inﬂuenced by numerous parameters that probably interact with
each other.
DREAMING AND NEUROSCIENCE
The neuroscientiﬁc approach to dreaming arose at the end of the
1950swith the discovery of REMduring human sleep by theAmer-
ican physiologist Nathaniel Kleitman and his team (Aserinsky and
Kleitman, 1953; Dement and Kleitman, 1957a). During these sleep
episodes with saccades, the researchers noticed a decrease in volt-
age and an increase in frequency in the EEG, accompanied by an
increase in cardiac frequency variability and a decrease in body
movements. They concluded that these physiological modiﬁca-
tions indicate a particular sleep stage,which they called REM sleep.
A few years later, the French team led by neurobiologist Michel
Jouvet discovered that the lack of movement during REM sleep
in cats was due to a general muscular atonia, controlled notably
by the locus coeruleus α in the brainstem (Jouvet and Michel,
1959; Berger, 1961 later showed that muscular atonia during REM
sleep also occurs in humans). Interestingly, the inability to move
during REM sleep indicates deep sleep and paradoxically, the fast
EEG activity of REM sleep resembles EEG activity in wakefulness.
Jouvet concluded that this particular physiological state is asso-
ciated with a “third state” of the brain (in addition to the brain
states associated with wakefulness and NREM sleep) which he
called “paradoxical sleep” instead of “REM sleep” (Jouvet et al.,
1959; Jouvet, 1992). Several years later, Fisher et al. (1965) discov-
ered another physiological characteristic of REM sleep: the penile
erection.
During the same period, the American team noticed that a
subject awakened during REM sleep very often reported a dream
(80% of awakenings in REM sleep vs. 6% of awakenings in NREM
sleep are followed by a dream report, according to Dement and
Kleitman, 1957b). Researchers concluded that dreaming occurs
during REM sleep. The eye movements of REM sleep would allow
the dreamer to scan the imaginary scene of the dream (the scan-
ning hypothesis); the cerebral cortex activation revealed by the
rapid EEG would allow intense cognitive activity, creating the
complex stories of a dream; and the lack of muscle tone would
prevent the dreamer from acting out his dreams. From that time
on, researchers investigated REM sleep to obtain answers about
dreaming.
In the 1990s, researchers used functional neuroimaging tech-
niques such as positron emission tomography (PET) to investigate
brain activity during REM sleep in humans. This new approach
enabled researchers to demonstrate that the functional organiza-
tion of the brain during REM sleep is different from the functional
organization of the brain during wakefulness (Maquet et al., 1996;
Braun et al., 1998). In comparison to wakefulness, brain activity
during REM sleep is decreased in some brain regions (e.g., in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Braun et al., 1998) and increased
in other regions (e.g., in the occipital and temporal cortex, the
hippocampus and parahippocampus, the anterior cingulate, the
precentral and postcentral gyri, the superior parietal cortex, and
the pons; Braun et al., 1998; Maquet et al., 2000). Looking more
generally for brain activity correlating with REM sleep (the vigi-
lance states considered included wakefulness, slow-wave sleep, and
REM sleep), Maquet et al. (1996) found negative correlations in
the precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junc-
tion, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and positive correlations
in the amygdala, anterior cingulate, postcentral gyrus, thalamus,
and pons (see Schwartz and Maquet, 2002; Maquet et al., 2005; Nir
and Tononi, 2010 for reviews). Based on these results, researchers
argued that the particular functional organizationof the braindur-
ing REM sleep could explain the phenomenological characteristics
of dream reports (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 2002; Schwartz and
Maquet, 2002; Maquet et al., 2005; Nir and Tononi, 2010). They
considered that brain activity increases and decreases during REM
sleep could be interpreted on the basis of what we know about
brain activity during wakefulness. In this context, the increased
occipital cortex activity during REM sleep could explain the visual
component of dream reports because neuroimaging results dur-
ing wakefulness showed that visual imagery with the eyes closed
activates the occipital cortex (Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003). The
decreased activity in the temporoparietal junction during REM
sleep may explain why dreams are mainly experienced in the ego-
centric coordinates of the ﬁrst-person; indeed,duringwakefulness,
activity in the temporoparietal junction was reported to be greater
for allocentric vs. egocentric representation (e.g.,Ruby andDecety,
2001; Zacks et al., 2003) and for third- vs. ﬁrst-person perspective
(e.g., Ruby and Decety, 2003, 2004). The increased activity in the
hippocampus during REM sleep could explain why dreams are
often composed of known images or characters, as the hippocam-
pus is known to be associated with the encoding and retrieval of
lived events during wakefulness (e.g., Piolino et al., 2009). The
decreased activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex during REM
sleep could explain why dream stories lack consistency, why the
dreamer’s perception of time is altered, why the dream story is
beyond the control of the dreamer and why the dreamer is con-
vinced that the dream story is really happening. Indeed, during
wakefulness, the lateral prefrontal cortex is involved in executive
function, cognitive control, and working memory (Petrides, 2005;
Koechlin and Hyaﬁl, 2007). The increased activity in the medial
prefrontal cortex during REM sleep could explain the attribution
of thoughts, beliefs, and emotions to the characters in the dream
because,duringwakefulness, themedial prefrontal cortex is known
to participate in mind reading (Ruby et al., 2007, 2009; Legrand
and Ruby, 2009). The increased activity in the motor cortex (pre-
central gyrus) during REM sleep could explain the movements of
the characters’ bodies in the dream because, during wakefulness,
motor imagery, and the imagination of someone’s action from
the third-person perspective involve the precentral gyrus (Decety
et al., 1994; Ruby and Decety, 2001). Finally, the amygdala’s activ-
ity during REM sleep could explain why emotions, especially fear,
are often mentioned in dream reports; indeed, the amygdala is
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involved in the processing of emotional stimuli duringwakefulness
(Adolphs, 2008).
In conclusion, results from experimental psychology and neu-
roscience allow us to better understand the phenomenology
of dreaming and the cerebral correlates of some characteris-
tics of dream reports. Still, what do they tell us about the role
of dreaming? What are the current hypotheses about dream
function(s)?
HYPOTHESES ABOUT DREAM FUNCTION(S)
No function
At the end of the twentieth century, the neurologist Alan Hobson,
who was profoundly anti-psychoanalysis, proposed a theory that
deprived dreaming of any function. Hobson argued that dream-
ing is an epiphenomenon of REM sleep: “Because dreams are so
difﬁcult to remember, it seems unlikely that attention to their con-
tent could afford much in the way of high-priority survival value.
Indeed, it might instead be assumed that dreaming is an epiphe-
nomenon of REM sleep whose cognitive content is so ambiguous
as to invite misleading or even erroneous interpretation” (Hobson
et al., 1998).
Psychological individualism
In contrast, other teams, like Michel Jouvet’s, believed that dream-
ing serves a vital function. In 1979, Jouvet’s teamblockedmuscular
atonia during REM sleep in a cat by damaging the locus coeruleus
α in its brainstem. This lesion resulted in the appearance of move-
ments duringREMsleep.Movies from the Jouvet lab show sleeping
cats performing complex motor actions (with altered control and
coordination) resembling those of wakefulness, such as fur lick-
ing, growling, chasing prey, mastication, and ﬁghting. From these
videos, the authors concluded that the cat was acting out its dream,
and they called this non-physiological state “oneiric behavior”
(Sastre and Jouvet, 1979). These results led Jouvet to propose that
dreaming plays a role in reinforcing a species’ typical behavior.
Later in his career, Jouvet moved toward a hypothesis focusing on
the role of dreaming in the individual dimension. He speculated
that dreams (note that, for Jouvet, dreams and paradoxical sleep
were equivalent) could be involved in psychological individual-
ism and in the stability of the dreamer’s personality (Jouvet, 1991,
1992, 1998). According to Jouvet, “the brain is the sole organ of
homeotherms that do not undergo cell division. We thus have to
explain how certain aspects of psychological heredity (found in
homozygote twins raised in different surroundings) may persist
for a whole life (psychological individuation). A deﬁnitive genetic
programming during development (by neurogenesis) is unlikely
due to the plasticity of the nervous system. That is why we have
to consider the possibility of an iterative genetic programming.
The internal mechanisms (synchronous) of paradoxical sleep (SP)
are particularly adapted to such programming. This would acti-
vate an endogenous system of stimulation that would stimulate
and stabilize receptors genetically programmed by DNA in some
neuronal circuits. The excitation of these neurons during SP leads
to oniric behaviors that could be experimentally revealed – the
lists of these behaviors are speciﬁc to each individual and indirect
data suggest a genetic component of this programming. Amongst
the mechanisms allowing the iterative programming of SP, sleep
is particularly important. Security – and hence the inhibition of
the arousal system – is a sine qua non-condition for genetic pro-
gramming to take place. In that sense, sleep could very well be the
guardian of dreaming” (Jouvet, 1991). In other words, Jouvet’s
hypothesis is that paradoxical sleep restores neuronal circuitry
that was modiﬁed during the day to preserve the expression of
the genetic program that codes for psychological characteristics.
This process would ensure the stability of personality across time.
The threat simulation theory
The Finnish psychologist Antti Revonsuo recently proposed a
hypothesis called threat simulation theory,which explains the fear-
ful characteristics of dream content (Revonsuo, 2000; Valli and
Revonsuo, 2009). According to this theory, dreams serve as virtual
training places to improve threat avoidance or threat ﬁghting abil-
ity. The theory postulates that such nocturnal training makes the
dreamer more efﬁcient at resolving threatening situations during
wakefulness.
Emotional regulation
Cartwright et al. (1998a,b) defended the idea that dreaming is
involved in emotional regulation.Her team showed that, in healthy
subjects, the depression level before sleep was signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with affect in the ﬁrst REM report. Her team also observed
that low scorers on the depression scale displayed a ﬂat distri-
bution of positive and negative affect in dreams, whereas those
with a depressed mood before sleep showed a pattern of decreas-
ing negative and increasing positive affect in dreams reported from
successiveREMperiods (Cartwright et al., 1998a). These results led
Cartwright’s team to suggest that dreaming may actively moderate
mood overnight in normal subjects. The team strengthened this
hypothesis by showing that among subjects who were depressed
because of a divorce, those who reported more negative dreams at
the beginning of sleep and fewer at the night’s end were more likely
to be in remission 1 year later than subjects who had fewer nega-
tive dreams at the beginning of sleep and more at the end of the
night (Cartwright et al., 1998b). The researchers concluded that
negative dreams early in the night may reﬂect a within-sleep mood
regulation process, whereas those that occur later may indicate a
failure in the completion of this process.
Memory consolidation
Finally, a currentmainstreamhypothesis in cognitive neuroscience
credits sleep and dreaming with a role in memory consolidation
(for a recent review, see Diekelmann and Born, 2010). Numer-
ous studies have shown that brain activity during training is
replayed during post-training sleep (e.g., using a serial reaction
time task Maquet et al., 2000, demonstrated replay during REM
sleep; using a maze exploration task Peigneux et al., 2004, demon-
strated replay during slow-wave sleep). Decreased performance
during the post-training day in sleep-deprived subjects further
suggested that the replay of brain activity at night contributes to
memory consolidation (e.g., Maquet et al., 2003). Only recently,
however, have experimental results in humans argued in favor of
a role of dreaming per se in memory consolidation. In one study,
subjects were trained on a virtual navigation task before taking a
nap. Post-nap tests showed that subjects who dreamed about the
task performed better than subjects who did not dream (note that
only 4 out of 50 subjects dreamed about the task in this study;
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Wamsley et al., 2010). Using a different approach,Nielsen and col-
leagues provided additional arguments supporting a link between
dreams and memory (Nielsen et al., 2004; Nielsen and Stenstrom,
2005). This team demonstrated that dreams preferably incorpo-
rate events that the dreamer lived the day before and events that the
dreamer lived 7 days before the dream (U shaped curve). Animal
studies have shown that after associative learning, the excitabil-
ity of hippocampal cells increases (which leads to an increase in
neuronal plasticity) and then returns to baseline 7 days after train-
ing (Thompson et al., 1996). The similarity between the delay of
episodic event incorporation into dreams and the delay of post-
training cellular plasticity in the hippocampus led the Canadian
team to suggest a link between dreaming and episodic memory
consolidation.
In summary, the preceding section describes the current state
of the art on dreaming, its phenomenology and cerebral correlates
and hypotheses about its functions. Some substantial advances
have been made, but much remains to be understood.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
THE LINK BETWEEN ONEIRIC BEHAVIORS AND DREAM REPORTS
A piece of evidence in favor of a strong link between REM sleep
and dreaming is the oneiric behavior (the appearance of complex
motor behaviorswhenmotor inhibition is suppressedduringREM
sleep) discovered by Sastre and Jouvet (1979) in cats and repro-
duced by Sanford et al. (2001) in rats. Researchers interpreted
these results as the animal acting out its dream. However, as ani-
mals do not talk, the link between oneiric behavior and dream
recall cannot be tested experimentally. This limitation seriously
hampers our understanding of dreaming. In humans, complex
motor behaviors (e.g., talking, grabbing, and manipulating imag-
inary objects, walking, and running) can also occur during REM
sleep in a pathological context. This syndrome is called REM sleep
behavior disorder (RBD). It can be caused by substance with-
drawal (e.g., alcohol, Nitrazepam) or intoxication (e.g., caffeine,
tricyclic antidepressants) or by various diseases (e.g., Parkinson’s
andAlzheimer’s diseases, pontine neoplasms). According to physi-
cians experts on this syndrome, some patients report dreams that
are consistent with their behaviors in REM sleep (Mahowald and
Schenck, 2000). According to the literature, however, such matches
seem to be loose and not systematic. Only one study has tested
whether observers can link dream content to sleep behaviors in
RBD (Valli et al., 2011). In this study, each video recording of
motor manifestations was combined with four dream reports,
and seven judges had to match the video clip with the correctly
reported dream content. The authors found that reported dream
content can be linked to motor behaviors at a level better than
chance. However, only 39.5% of video-dream pairs were correctly
identiﬁed. Note, however, that because the authors obtained only
movements and not behavioral episodes for many RBD patients,
the link between videos and dream reports was unfairly difﬁcult
to make.
It is important to note that motor behavior during sleep can
happen outside of REM sleep. Sleepwalking and sleep terrors,
which occur duringNREMsleep, are usually not considered dream
enactments. However, we know that dreams can happen during
NREM sleep, and many patients report dreamlike mentation after
awakening from sleepwalking or sleep terrors (71%, according to
Oudiette et al., 2009). In addition, Oudiette et al. (2009) reported
that the dreamlike mentation can correspond with the sleep
behavior in NREM sleep. Consequently, the authors concluded
that sleepwalking may represent an acting out of corresponding
dreamlike mentation.
Recent research suggests that any kind of motor behavior dur-
ing sleep can be considered an oneiric behavior. One of the
challenges for future research is to test the strength of the link
between these oneiric behaviors and dream reports in a controlled
and systematic way.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF DREAMING
Despite the numerous neuroimaging studies of sleep in humans,
the neurophysiological correlates of dreaming remain unclear.
Indeed, dreaming can happen during NREM sleep, and
although NREM brain activity differs substantially from REM
sleep brain activity (Maquet et al., 2000; Buchsbaum et al., 2001),
some NREM dreams are phenomenologically indistinguishable
from REM dreams (Hobson, 1988; Cavallero et al., 1992; Cicogna
et al., 1998;Wittmann et al., 2004). This phenomenon is difﬁcult to
understand givenwhat we currently know about the sleeping brain
and about dreaming. One explanation may rely on the possibility
that brain activity during sleep is not as stable as we think.
Brain activity during REM sleep in humans is considered to
be well understood (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 2002; Schwartz and
Maquet, 2002; Nir and Tononi, 2010), but several results question
this notion. First, contrary to the common belief that dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex activity decreases duringREMsleep, several stud-
ies have reported increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex during REM sleep (Hong et al., 1995, 2009; Nofzinger et al.,
1997; Kubota et al., 2011). Second, brain activity during REM sleep
is heterogeneous. The mean regional cerebral blood ﬂow during
1minof REMsleep (e.g., as reported inMaquet et al., 1996) and the
regional cerebral blood ﬂow associated with the rapid eye move-
ments of REM sleep (Hong et al., 2009; Miyauchi et al., 2009)
highlight different brain regions. Finally, few congruencies have
been noted in the results of studies investigating brain activity dur-
ing REM sleep (Hong et al., 1995, 2009; Maquet et al., 1996, 2000;
Braun et al., 1997,1998;Nofzinger et al., 1997;Peigneux et al., 2001;
Wehrle et al., 2005; Miyauchi et al., 2009; Kubota et al., 2011), even
between studies using the same technique and the same contrasts
(e.g., Braun et al., 1998; Maquet et al., 2000), or between studies
investigating the same REM event (e.g., brain activity associated
with rapid eyes movements, as in Peigneux et al., 2001; Wehrle
et al., 2005; Hong et al., 2009; Miyauchi et al., 2009). Furthermore,
few brain regions are consistently reported across the majority of
the studies. This inconsistency suggests great intra- and intersub-
ject variability in brain activity during REM sleep in humans. A
challenge for future research will be to ﬁnd out whether the vari-
ability in brain activity during REM sleep can be explained by the
variability in dream content.
Because dream reports can be collected after awakenings from
any sleep stage, one may hypothesize that the brain activity
that subserves dreaming (if such brain activity is reproducible
across dreams) is quite constant throughout the night and can
be observed during all sleep stages. Some results have supported
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this hypothesis and encouraged further attention in this direction.
Buchsbaum et al. (2001), for example, reported that metabolism
in the primary visual areas and certain parts of the lateral temporal
cortex does not ﬂuctuate much across REM and slow-wave sleep.
Similarly, Nielsen’s team found that dream recall (vs. no dream
recall) was associated with decreased alpha (8–12Hz) power in
the EEG preceding awakening, regardless of the sleep stage (Stage
2 or REM sleep; Esposito et al., 2004). Interestingly, some authors
have suggested that decreased power in the alpha band during
wakefulness reﬂects search and retrieval processes in long-term
memory (for a review, see Klimesch, 1999).
PROCESSES OF SELECTION AND ORGANIZATION OF DREAM
REPRESENTATIONS
Nielsen’s team found that episodic events from the 1, 7, and 8 days
before a dream were more often incorporated into the dream than
were events from 2 or 6 days before the dream (Nielsen et al., 2004;
results reproduced by Blagrove et al., 2011). This result tells us
that internal processes control and shape dream content and thus
help us to constrain and shape hypotheses about the function and
biological basis of dreaming.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Saint-Denys (1867)
showed that a sensory stimulus (e.g., the scent of lavender) pre-
sented to a sleeping subject without his or her knowledge could
induce the incorporation of an event associated with the stim-
ulus (e.g., holidays spent near a lavender ﬁeld) into the dream,
regardless of the delay between the dreamand the association stim-
ulus/events (lavender scent/holidays). The author demonstrated
that the external world can inﬂuence dream content in a direct or
indirect way.
Finally, it appears that both external and internal parameters
can shape or govern dream content. Nonetheless, few of these
parameters are known, and some regularities in the phenomenol-
ogy of dreams suggest that more inﬂuencing parameters remain
to be discovered. For example, some individuals experience recur-
ring themes, characters, or places in their dreams. In line with this
observation, Michael Schredl’s team showed that the content and
style of a person’s life strongly inﬂuence dream content (Schredl
and Hofmann, 2003). However, the rule(s) governing which lived
events are incorporated into dreams remain unknown.Do the rep-
resentations constituting the dream emerge randomly from the
brain, or do they surface according to certain parameters? Simi-
larly, is the organization of the dream’s representations chaotic, or
is it determined by rules? Does dreaming have a meaning? What
is/are the function(s) of dreaming?
DREAMING, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND
NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS
Psychoanalysis, which was developed by the neurologist Sigmund
Freud in the beginning of the twentieth century, proposes answers
to the questions raised above. Indeed, his theory of the human
mind comprises hypotheses about the rules of selection and
organization of the representations that constitute dreams.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Freud presented the
concept of the unconscious. He proposed that a part of our mind
is made up of thoughts, desires, emotions, and knowledge that
we are not aware of, but that nevertheless profoundly inﬂuence
and guide our behaviors. In his books (e.g., Freud, 1900, 1920),
Freud proposes that the unconscious mind comes out in slips and
dreams. Its expression, however, is coded within dreams (the work
of dream), and unconscious thoughts are distorted before they
emerge in the conscious mind of the sleeping subject (manifest
content of the dream). As a consequence, the dreamer is not dis-
turbed by repressed and unacceptable thoughts (latent content
of the dream) and can continue sleeping (this is the reason why
Freud considered dreams the guardians of sleep). Hence, accord-
ing to Freud, decoding dreams’ latent content provides an access
to the unconscious mind.
In Freud’s theory of the mind, unconscious thoughts and feel-
ings may cause the patient to experience life difﬁculties and/or
maladjustment, and free unconscious thoughts can help the
patient gain insight into his/her situation. As a consequence, Freud
developed techniques to decode dreams and provide a way for an
analyst to look inside the words and unconscious images of the
patient, and to free them through patient insight. One of these
techniques is called free association, and is regarded as an essen-
tial part of the psychoanalytic therapy process. In order for an
analyst to get to the latent content of a dream, he requires the
patient to discuss the dream’s manifest content and encourage
free association about the dream. Free association is the principle
that the patient is to say anything and everything that comes to
mind. This includes decensoring his/her own speech so that he/she
truly expresses everything. Over time, the therapist or analyst will
draw associations between the many trains of uncensored speech
the patient shares during each session. This can lead to patient
insight into their unconscious thoughts or repressed memories,
and the accomplishment of their ultimate goal of “freedom from
the oppression of the unconscious” (Trull, 2005).
Hence, Freud considered that dreams, as well as slips, have a
meaning and can be interpreted, so that one is justiﬁed in infer-
ring from them the presence of restrained or repressed intentions
(Freud, 1900, 1920). Note that, in Freud’s theory of the mind, the
words “meaning” and “intention” are closely linked: “Let us agree
once more on what we understand by the ‘meaning’ of a psychic
process. A psychic process is nothing more than the purpose which
it serves and the position which it holds in a psychic sequence. We
can also substitute the word ‘purpose’ or ‘intention’ for ‘meaning’
in most of our investigations” (Freud, 1920).
In other words, according to Freud, decoding dreams with the
free association method provides an access to what makes each of
us so special, uncorvering the forces that guide one’s behavior. It
gives access to an unknown dimension of ourselves that is funda-
mental in understandingwhowe are. It provides access to personal
meaning.
This hypothesis, attributing signiﬁcant importance and mean-
ing to dreams, has rarely been considered by neuroscientists who
often consider Freud’s work and theory unscientiﬁc.
However, this situation may change as the relationship between
psychoanalysis and neuroscience evolves. The starting point was
the creation of the International Society for Neuropsychoanalysis
in 2000. It was founded by neuropsychologist and psychoanalyst
Mark Solms with the intention to promote interactions and col-
laborations between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. The chal-
lenge was serious, as illustrated by neuroscientist Alan Hobson’s
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aggressiveness in the famous dream debate (Alan Hobson vs. Mark
Solms) entitled “Should Freud’s dream theory be abandoned?”
held in Tucson, Arizona, in 2006 during the Towards a Science
of Consciousness meeting (scientiﬁc arguments can be found in
Solms, 2000 and Hobson et al., 2000). Alan Hobson tried to con-
vince the assembly that Freud was 100% wrong and that Freud’s
dream theory was misguided and misleading and should be aban-
doned. He aimed to demonstrate that Freud’s dream theory is
incompatible with what we know about how the brain works. He
added that Freud’s dream theory was not scientiﬁc because it was
not testable or falsiﬁable. Finally, he presented hismodel of dream-
ing, the activation-synthesis hypothesis (Hobson and McCarley,
1977; Hobson et al., 2000): “The Activation-Synthesis model of
dream construction proposed that the phasic signals arising in
the pontine brainstem during REM sleep and impinging upon the
cortex and limbic forebrain led directly to the visual and motor
hallucinations, emotion, and distinctively bizarre cognition that
characterize dream mentation. In doing so, these chaotically gen-
erated signals arising from the brain stem acted as a physiological
Rorschach test, initiating a process of image and narrative syn-
thesis involving associative and language regions of the brain and
resulting in the construction of the dream scenarios.” In contrast,
Mark Solms demonstrated that what is currently known about the
dreaming brain is at least broadly consistent with Freud’s dream
theory. He argued that it is generally accepted that brain stem
activation is necessary, but not sufﬁcient, to explain the partic-
ular characteristics of dream consciousness. What does explain
the particular characteristics of dream consciousness, according
to Solms, are the following features of brain activity during REM
sleep (Braun et al., 1997): the activation of core forebrain emo-
tion and instinctual drive mechanisms, i.e., the limbic and par-
alimbic brain areas (the anterior cingulate, insula, hippocampus,
parahippocampal gyrus, and temporal pole), and of the posterior
perceptual system (the fusiform gyrus, superior, inferior and mid-
dle temporal gyrus, and angular gyrus) and the deactivation of
executive dorsolateral frontal control mechanisms (the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex). He further argued that his lesion studies
(Solms, 1997) are congruent with neuroimaging results because
they showed that a total cessation of dreaming results from lesions
in the medial part of the frontal lobe and in the temporoparietal
junction (whereas no cessation of dreaming was observed for core
brainstem lesions or for dorsolateral prefrontal lesions). Finally he
emphasized that the activation of motivational mechanisms (such
as drives and basic emotions) and of posterior perceptual system
associated with deactivation of the executive control (i.e., reality
oriented regulatorymechanism)duringREMsleep, is broadly con-
sistentwith Freud’s dream theorywhich claims that our instinctual
drive states (notably appetitive and libidinal drive system) are rel-
atively disinhibited during sleep. Note that experimental results
demonstrating the existence of unconscious representations that
guide behavior (e.g., Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968; Bunce et al., 1999;
Arminjon, 2011, for a review) could also have been cited in sup-
port of Freud’s dream theory. This debate was a success for Mark
Solms and neuropsychoanalysis. Indeed, at the end of the debate,
approximately 100 people voted “no” (i.e., “Freud’s dream theory
should not be abandoned”), approximately 50 people voted “yes”
and 50 voted “I don’t know”.
Solms’ (1997, 2000) approach to dreaming and his experimen-
tal results fundamentally challenged our current understanding
of dreaming. He proposes that dreaming and REM sleep are con-
trolled by different brain mechanisms. According to Solms, REM
sleep is controlled by cholinergic brain stem mechanisms, whereas
dreaming is mediated by forebrain mechanisms that are proba-
bly dopaminergic. This implies that dreaming can be activated by
a variety of NREM triggers. Several experimental results support
this hypothesis.
First, behavioral studies have demonstrated that the link
between REM sleep and dream reports is lax. Subjects awakened
during NREM sleep can recall dreams at a high rate (Foulkes,
1962: 74% of awakenings in NREM sleep were followed by dream
reports; Cavallero et al., 1992: 64%; Wittmann et al., 2004: 60%);
dreams can be recalled after a nap consisting only of NREM sleep
(Salzarulo, 1971; Palagini et al., 2004); and some individuals never
recall dreams, even when awakened from REM sleep (Pagel, 2003).
In addition, in healthy subjects with a normal dream recall fre-
quency (around 1 dream recall per week, Schredl, 2008), dream
recall after an awakening during REM sleep is not systematic: 5–
30% of awakenings in REM sleep are not followed by a dream
recall, according to the literature (e.g., Dement and Kleitman,
1957a,b; Foulkes, 1962; Hobson, 1988). Finally, 5–10% of NREM
dreams cannot be distinguished from REM dreams based on their
content (Hobson, 1988; Cavallero et al., 1992; Cicogna et al., 1998;
Wittmann et al., 2004).
Second, as Solms (2000) argued, the amount of dream recall
can be modulated by dopamine agonists (Scharf et al., 1978;
Nausieda et al., 1982) without concomitant modiﬁcation of the
duration and frequency of REM sleep (Hartmann et al., 1980).
Dream recall can be suppressed by focal brain lesions (at the
temporo-parieto-occipital junction and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex; Solms, 1997, 2000). These lesions do not have any appre-
ciable effects on REM frequency, duration, or density (Kerr et al.,
1978; Michel and Sieroff, 1981). Finally, some clinical studies sug-
gest that a dream can be triggered by nocturnal seizures in NREM
sleep, i.e., by focal brain stimulation. Some cases of recurring
nightmares caused by epileptiform activity in the temporal lobe
have indeed been reported (Solms, 2000).
CONCLUSION: COLLABORATION BETWEEN NEUROSCIENCE
AND PSYCHOANALYSIS WOULD BENEFIT DREAM RESEARCH
Considering the issues that remain unresolved (e.g., neurophysio-
logic variability, parameter(s) inﬂuencing the emergence of repre-
sentations in dreams, the meaning of dreams), a psychoanalytic
perspective would certainly beneﬁt dream research by provid-
ing new directions/leads and helping to reach a comprehensive
understanding of dreaming.
On the one hand, psychological research has demonstrated
that dream content is inﬂuenced by one’s personal life, espe-
cially personal concerns (Schwartz, 1999; Schwartz and Maquet,
2002; Schredl and Hofmann, 2003), and some neuroscientists have
hypothesized that dreaming is involved in psychological individ-
ualism. Thus, both psychology and neuroscience have provided
results and hypotheses that validate the possibility that dream-
ing has something to do with personal and meaningful issues. On
the other hand, Freud argued that the unconscious, which guides
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behaviors and desires, express itself during dreams. The two dis-
ciplines’ (cognitive neuroscience and psychoanalysis) convergence
on dreaming thus seems obvious; however, very little collaboration
has occurred to date.
Note that some experimental studies in psychology have con-
sidered the psychoanalytic perspective. For example, Greenberg
et al. (1992) attempted “a research-based reconsideration of the
psychoanalytical theory of dreaming.” They evaluated the pres-
ence of problems (deﬁned as an expression of negative feeling or
any situation evoking such feeling or requiring some change or
adaptation) during dreaming and pre- and post-sleep wakefulness
in two subjects. They showed that problems occurred very fre-
quently in the manifest dream content and that these problems
were nearly systematically related to the problems noted during
pre-sleep wakefulness. In addition, they observed that effective
dreams (i.e., dreams that presented some solution to the indi-
viduals’ problems) were followed by a waking state in which
the impact of the problems was diminished, whereas ineffective
dreams were followed by the persistence of the problems. This
study thus conﬁrmed that personal concerns inﬂuence dream
content. In addition it provided new results suggesting that dream-
ing may have some psychological problem-solving function (this
result recalls the neuroscientiﬁc ﬁndings that sleep has a cognitive
problem-solving function associated with brain reorganization;
e.g., Wagner et al., 2004; Darsaud et al., 2011). Greenberg et al.’s
(1992) study managed to quantify personal issues and clearly
broadened the cognitive neuroscience perspective ondreaming. To
proceed further, approaches integrating psychoanalysis and neu-
roscience must now be developed. Several subjective issues at the
core of the psychoanalytic approach, such as the concept of per-
sonal meaning, the concept of unconscious episodic memory and
the subject’s history, are not addressed or considered in cognitive
neuroscience. This limitation hampers the understanding of psy-
chological and neurophysiological functioning in humans. These
issues must be addressed, and the expertise of psychoanalysts in
singularity and personal meaning is needed to do so in neuro-
science and to further the understanding of dreaming and of the
psyche.
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